CVE-2026-115731: Perforce Puppet RCE Added to CISA KEV 13 Days After the First Exploitation Report

CISA added CVE-2026-115731, a deserialization flaw in Perforce Puppet Server, to KEV on Nov 17, 2026, 13 days after a Reddit post first claimed exploitation. Affected versions, fixed releases, why autosign matters and what to check on your CA.

CVE-2026-115731: Perforce Puppet RCE Added to CISA KEV 13 Days After the First Exploitation Report

CISA added CVE-2026-115731 to its Known Exploited Vulnerabilities (KEV) catalog on Nov 17, 2026, with a federal due date of Dec 1. It is a deserialization flaw in the report processing of Puppet Server, part of Perforce Puppet, the configuration management platform that pushes software and settings to a fleet of machines. A client holding any certificate signed by the Puppet certificate authority (CA) can send a crafted report and run code on the server as its service user.

The server is the part worth protecting. Perforce's advisory, as quoted by SecurityWeek, says a successful attack could expose the server's certificate-signing key, let an attacker issue trusted certificates, and change the software and configuration delivered to managed systems on their next Puppet run. The fix shipped on Nov 3. The first claim of exploitation, a Reddit post, is dated Nov 4. The KEV listing came 13 days after that.

How the bug works

Puppet agents send a report to the server after each run. Neodyme AG, the firm that found the bug, says the server's report endpoint (/puppet/v3/report/{agent_name} on port 8140) passes an "events" object into a deserializer. A report that carries a crafted rich-data type, submitted with a PUT request, ends up running code as the Puppet Server service user (CWE-502 and CWE-94).

The attacker needs a client certificate signed by the Puppet CA, so the flaw is formally authenticated. In practice the bar can be low. CISA's description says that if the CA automatically signs certificate requests without strong verification, an unauthenticated attacker on the network can obtain a valid certificate and then use the bug. Neodyme adds that most large companies run with autosign enabled.

Neodyme also says that, whatever the configuration, code execution on a Puppet server lets an attacker take the CA signing keys and impersonate other hosts. How much further an attacker gets depends on how the server is set up and which orchestration protocols are enabled. Neodyme's lab demonstration chained a stolen CA key into root access through a Puppet Enterprise orchestration broker.

A companion flaw, CVE-2026-115732, was fixed the same day. It is an authorization bypass in certificate name matching, scored 9.0 under CVSS 4.0, and it is not in KEV. CISA's enrichment on that record listed exploitation as "none" on Nov 6.

Who is affected

Perforce's CVE record lists three Puppet Enterprise ranges. THN and SecurityWeek add Puppet Core, and VulnTracker also tracks the Red Hat Satellite packages.

Product

Affected

Fixed

Puppet Enterprise 2023.8

2023.8.0 to before 2023.8.13

2023.8.13

Puppet Enterprise 2025

2025.0.0 to before 2025.12.1

2025.12.1

Puppet Enterprise 2026

2026.0.0 to before 2026.0.1

2026.0.1

Puppet Core 9

9.0.0 to before 9.1.3

9.1.3

Puppet Core 8

8.x to before 8.22.2

8.22.2

OpenVox Agent

not stated

9.3.0 and 8.32.0

OpenVox Server

not stated

9.2.0 and 8.18.0

The CVE record's fix text says to upgrade to a release that bundles puppet-agent 8.22.2 or 9.1.3, then restart puppetserver. The OpenVox versions come from THN. Red Hat's Satellite 6.16 EUS update (RHSA-2026:95655) ships openvox-agent 8.32.0 and openvox-server 8.18.0, which matches, and VulnTracker lists fixed packages for Satellite and Capsule 6.16, 6.17 and 6.19. I could not find OpenVox's own release notes for these versions. SecurityWeek says a proof-of-concept exploit for OpenVox was published shortly after the patch.

Fix on Nov 3, KEV on Nov 17

Date

Event

Days after the fix

Nov 3

Fixes released (17:00 UTC) and CVE record published (20:40 UTC)

0

Nov 4

First exploitation claim, a Reddit post

1

Nov 17

Added to CISA KEV

14

Dec 1

Federal due date

28

Neodyme says the fixes were released on Nov 3 at 17:00 UTC, and the CVE record went public at 20:40 UTC the same day. The first claim of exploitation, per THN, is a Reddit post by a user named transdimensia dated Nov 4, who traced an intrusion back to a badly misconfigured CA. SecurityWeek likewise says the flaw was flagged as exploited on Nov 4. THN adds that there are still no details on how the flaw is being used. The KEV entry followed 13 days later, on Nov 17, with Dec 1 as the federal deadline.

The evidence is thinner than the KEV label suggests. I could not read the Reddit post, so the claim reaches me through THN's quote. The post's address as THN links it names CVE-2026-115732, the sibling bug, while the quoted sentence refers to CVE-2026-115731 with the CVE prefix completed by THN in square brackets. I cannot tell which of the two flaws the user meant. CISA's own notice could not be read either; its wording, "reports of active exploitation", comes from THN.

Reading it on VulnTracker

The page shows a CVSS score of 9.9 Critical. That is the NVD CVSS 3.1 score (AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H). Perforce's CVE record carries only a CVSS 4.0 score of 9.4, and THN and SecurityWeek both quote 9.4, so the same flaw reads 9.4 or 9.9 depending on the source. VulnTracker also lists a second CVSS 4.0 entry from [email protected].

EPSS is 0.4%, a 0.4% chance of exploitation in the next 30 days and higher than 31% of all CVEs. The SSVC entry reads Active, Not automatable and Total technical impact. The KEV entry lists the date added as Nov 17, the due date as Dec 1 (13 days remaining on Nov 18) and ransomware use as Unknown. The status is Analyzed, with CWE-502 and CWE-94, and the Exploits tab shows 1 item and Newsroom 2.

Data notes: the Perforce advisory page loads only as an empty shell for me, so the vendor wording here comes from the CVE record, Neodyme's report and SecurityWeek's quote. NVD and CISA pages could not be read directly. VulnTracker dates the Red Hat Satellite 6.16 EUS advisory Nov 17, while the Red Hat page I read shows Nov 5.

What to do

Upgrade first. Move Puppet Enterprise to 2023.8.13, 2025.12.1 or 2026.0.1, Puppet Core to 9.1.3 or 8.22.2, and OpenVox to Agent 9.3.0 or 8.32.0 and Server 9.2.0 or 8.18.0. On Red Hat Satellite and Capsule, apply the relevant Satellite security update. Restart puppetserver after the upgrade. The same releases fix CVE-2026-115732. Federal agencies have until Dec 1.

Then turn off auto-signing and enforce strong validation of certificate requests. Perforce's advice, as quoted by SecurityWeek, is exactly that, because autosign is what turns an authenticated flaw into one an outside attacker can reach.

Then look at the CA. Neodyme says code execution on a Puppet server can expose the CA signing keys, so an unpatched server that untrusted clients could reach since Nov 3 deserves a closer look: signed certificates with names you do not recognize, reports submitted by agents you do not recognize, and whether the CA key should be replaced. That last step is my own general advice, not from Perforce. Keep port 8140 away from untrusted networks as well.

Takeaway

The server that decides which machines to trust was listed as exploited 14 days after its fix and 13 days after the first public claim, and the claim itself is still thin. If you run Puppet, treat the CA as part of the patch: upgrade, turn off autosign and check what the CA has signed. Track this and every other KEV addition with its score, EPSS, SSVC and due date on VulnTracker.

References