CVE-2026-98617

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: eth: fbnic: use the Rx queue napi pointer to find the napi vector The queue management ndos pick the napi vector for an Rx queue with: nv = fbn->napi[idx % fbn->num_napi]; The issue is this is only correct in the cases where there are no standalone Tx vectors. In those cases we were allocating the Tx vectors first and then the Rx so the queues would be pointing to Tx NAPI vectors instead of the Rx ones. The mapping the ndos want is already recorded. fbnic_set_netif_napi() publishes it with netif_queue_set_napi(), which stores the napi pointer in netdev_rx_queue.napi, and fbnic_reset_netif_napi() clears it again. Both run under the netdev instance lock that the queue management ndos also hold, so the pointer can be read directly. Use it and drop the divide. The pointer is NULL exactly while the datapath is down, so fbnic_queue_mem_alloc() can reject that case rather than reaching into freed state: netdev_rx_queue_restart() calls it before it tests netif_running(), and fbnic_pm_suspend() leaves netif_running() true across a PCIe recovery that never completes, so a queue restart can arrive after fbnic_stop() has freed the rings and the vectors. fbnic_stop() clears the association in fbnic_reset_netif_queues() before fbnic_free_napi_vectors(), so the NULL is always published first. fbnic_queue_start() and fbnic_queue_stop() need no check of their own, as netdev_rx_queue_reconfig() only reaches them once fbnic_queue_mem_alloc() has succeeded under the same instance lock.