CVE-2026-93252

ocfs2: fix circular locking dependency in ocfs2_init_acl()

N/A
Published: September 24, 2026 at 03:51 PM UTC
Updated: October 19, 2026 at 10:17 AM UTC
1 product affected across 1 vendorLinux Kernel

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Severity
N/A
Exploit prediction
EPSS 0.2%

Description

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ocfs2: fix circular locking dependency in ocfs2_init_acl() A lockdep warning indicates a circular locking dependency between `&oi->ip_xattr_sem` and `&journal->j_trans_barrier`: WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected is trying to acquire lock: (&oi->ip_xattr_sem){++++}-{4:4}, at: ocfs2_init_acl+0x2fd/0x7e0 fs/ocfs2/acl.c:367 but task is already holding lock: (&journal->j_trans_barrier){.+.+}-{4:4}, at: ocfs2_start_trans+0x3ab/0x700 fs/ocfs2/journal.c:369 The deadlock involves two code paths: Path 1 (setxattr) where `ocfs2_xattr_set()` acquires `ip_xattr_sem` (write) and then starts a transaction, which acquires `j_trans_barrier` (read); and Path 2 (mkdir/mknod) where `ocfs2_mknod()` starts a transaction (`j_trans_barrier` read) and then calls `ocfs2_init_acl()`, which attempts to acquire `ip_xattr_sem` (read) on the parent directory to retrieve the default ACL. Because rw_semaphores are subject to writer priority, a pending writer on `j_trans_barrier` (e.g., the journal commit thread) can cause Path 1 to block, while Path 2 is blocked waiting for Path 1 to release `ip_xattr_sem`. The patch fixes the lock ordering by precomputing the ACL state before starting the OCFS2 transaction, while preserving POSIX ACL storage semantics and the existing inode/security initialization order. By reading the parent directory's default ACL and preparing the new inode's ACLs outside the transaction, `ip_xattr_sem` is always acquired before `j_trans_barrier`. `struct ocfs2_acl_state` encapsulates the prepared ACL state, while `ocfs2_acl_init_prepare()` and `ocfs2_acl_init_release()` avoid code duplication between `ocfs2_mknod()` and `ocfs2_init_security_and_acl()`. `ocfs2_calc_xattr_init()` and `ocfs2_init_acl()` use this precomputed state, removing internal `ip_xattr_sem` acquisition and redundant disk reads. Additionally, remove the `ip_xattr_sem` acquisition from `ocfs2_xattr_set_handle()`. This function is only used while initializing a new inode that has not yet been inserted into the inode hash or attached to a dentry, meaning there is no risk of concurrent access and the lock is unnecessary.

Affected

Our own answer: ranges merged, affected separated from platform-only, with confidence and review flags.

15ac59a84750b3afc0a2b6f2636c4f7e6cbd6d5e16c8d569f5704a84164f30ff01b29879f34380651d5fdc1307eeb04b334c5dc23e11dbd6068d90eb3.18.1114.14.374.164.4.1344.9.104a66174eb4a149b7919d174d9a7ce6ad9909c5ee2b35bb8a41795caa05e09c3aacf7d78f1f20bac04
Vendor states this is fixed in 1222f7a3183b35c0c566899fdaead5c7c4043076 (fixed)
Vendor states this is fixed in 4936d4464d1ae10b5fbba64374085a0dcc060560 (fixed)
Vendor states this is fixed in 5b7b3c50c39ad0dc27e7418981e01c4183273f89 (fixed)
Vendor states this is fixed in 8931403ee3dcfe8a24a5267efec9d9460ab7a1b5 (fixed)
Vendor states this is fixed in 8d88f52fbbbcc18adf4091a955511d0cf605bf11 (fixed)
Vendor states this is fixed in bd7c05fb4a4776dff5a87b19008d28458647d15d (fixed)
Vendor states this is fixed in caf3056936fb8b5ce92e419cf8b246ce9c437343 (fixed)
Vendor states this is fixed in f8747d81aa6d3efe3ee339a9d912ff3ca6e4d758 (fixed)
Affected range stops below 3.19, so it looks safe — our inference, not a vendor statement
Affected range stops below 4.10, so it looks safe — our inference, not a vendor statement
Affected range stops below 4.15, so it looks safe — our inference, not a vendor statement
Vendor states this is fixed in 4.16 (unaffected)
Affected range stops below 4.5, so it looks safe — our inference, not a vendor statement
Vendor states this is fixed in 5.10.270 (unaffected)
Vendor states this is fixed in 5.15.221 (unaffected)
Vendor states this is fixed in 6.1.188 (unaffected)
Vendor states this is fixed in 6.12.110 (unaffected)
Vendor states this is fixed in 6.18.52 (unaffected)
Vendor states this is fixed in 6.6.157 (unaffected)
Vendor states this is fixed in 7.2.6 (unaffected)
Vendor states this is fixed in 7.3 (unaffected)
Vendor states this is fixed in 7.3-rc1 (unaffected)

Remediation

No guide yet

No remediation guidance has been written for this CVE yet, and no fixed version or vendor advisory is recorded against it.

Quick Info

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