CVE-2026-92503

ext4: fix ABBA deadlock in ext4_xattr_inode_cache_find()

N/A
Published: September 17, 2026 at 04:10 PM UTC
Updated: October 21, 2026 at 01:20 PM UTC
1 product affected across 1 vendorLinux Kernel

Using Linux by Linux?

Get instant alerts when new vulnerabilities affect Linux - before attackers find them.

Real-time alertsTrack your software stackFree plan available
Severity
N/A
Exploit prediction
EPSS 0.2%

Description

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ext4: fix ABBA deadlock in ext4_xattr_inode_cache_find() Syzbot/stress-ng reported an ABBA deadlock in ext4 when exercising concurrent xattr workloads (using the ea_inode mount/format option). The deadlock occurs between the running transaction and the eviction thread: - Task 1 (stress-ng): Holds a reference to a shared mbcache_entry (ce) and calls ext4_xattr_inode_cache_find() -> ext4_iget() to retrieve the corresponding EA inode. Since the EA inode is currently being evicted, ext4_iget() blocks in __wait_on_freeing_inode() waiting for eviction to complete. - Task 2 (eviction thread): Currently evicting the same EA inode in ext4_evict_ea_inode(). It calls mb_cache_entry_wait_unused(oe) which blocks waiting for Task 1 to release the reference to the mbcache_entry. To break this deadlock, implement a new ext4_iget() configuration flag named EXT4_IGET_NOWAIT. When set, perform a non-blocking lookup of the inode via VFS's find_inode_nowait() API. If the inode is currently being evicted (marked with I_FREEING or I_WILL_FREE) or created (I_CREATING), or if it is not present in the VFS inode cache (cache miss), simply skip it (returning -ENOENT) rather than waiting for eviction/creation to complete, breaking the ABBA cycle. Since we return -ENOENT immediately on a cache miss, we never attempt to allocate a new inode or call iget_locked(), completely eliminating any TOCTOU race window. If the returned inode is I_NEW, wait for its initialization to clear via wait_on_new_inode(). If initialization fails and the inode is unhashed during wait_on_new_inode() waking up (e.g., due to an I/O read error in another thread), safely drop the reference and return -ENOENT. This unhashed check is executed unconditionally on all cache-hit pathways to properly handle concurrent initialization failures. Finally, standard validation checks (including is_bad_inode, EXT4_EA_INODE_FL, file_acl, and xattr flags) are executed as normal inside check_igot_inode() to fully guarantee VFS-layer safety. In ext4_xattr_inode_cache_find(), invoke ext4_iget() with the new EXT4_IGET_NOWAIT flag to perform the non-blocking cache search.

Affected

Our own answer: ranges merged, affected separated from platform-only, with confidence and review flags.

0752e7fb549d90c33b4d4186f11cfd25a556d1dd0a46ef234756dca04623b7591e8ebb3440622f0b111103907234bffd0a34fba070ad9367de0587526.1.1076.106.6.476.9.7737fb7853acd5bc8984f6f42e4bfba3334be8ae1752e7fb549d90c33b4d4186f11cfd25a556d1dd
Vendor states this is fixed in 03438084a7b8621fb5c762dd3d04cff5f2630fb2 (fixed)
Vendor states this is fixed in 7720fddd1fe344d14be258a2028f74ebf1569511 (fixed)
Vendor states this is fixed in 6.10 (unaffected)
Vendor states this is fixed in 6.12.114 (unaffected)
Vendor states this is fixed in 6.18.57 (unaffected)
Affected range stops below 6.2, so it looks safe — our inference, not a vendor statement
Vendor states this is fixed in 6.6.160 (unaffected)
Affected range stops below 6.7, so it looks safe — our inference, not a vendor statement
Vendor states this is fixed in 7.2.6 (unaffected)
Vendor states this is fixed in 7.3 (unaffected)
Vendor states this is fixed in 7.3-rc1 (unaffected)

Remediation

No guide yet

No remediation guidance has been written for this CVE yet, and no fixed version or vendor advisory is recorded against it.

Quick Info

StatusRECEIVED

Get alerted

Stop reading CVE feeds looking for your own stack

Track the products you run and VulnTracker tells you when a new CVE affects them — with what is known about fixing it, and nothing about the rest.

Free plan, no card