CVE-2026-84747

Apache bRPC: Access Control Bypass via HTTP Request Paths Containing Empty Path Segments

HIGH
7.5
CVSS Score
Published: October 21, 2026 at 12:13 PM UTC
Updated: October 30, 2026 at 03:16 PM UTC
1 product affected across 1 vendorBrpc

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Severity
HIGH7.5
Exploit prediction
EPSS 0.5%
SSVC
No known exploit

Description

Interpretation conflict in the HTTP protocol implementation in Apache bRPC (version < 1.18.0) on all platforms allows remote attackers to bypass access control rules enforced by a front proxy. Root Cause: The method dispatch function FindMethodPropertyByURI() in bRPC's HTTP protocol splits the request path with a string splitter that skips empty fields, so paths containing empty path segments (consecutive slashes), such as //flags, /flags// and /flags//port, are dispatched to the same method as their collapsed form /flags. Per RFC 3986 these are distinct paths. A front proxy that enforces an ACL (e.g. blocking access to builtin services such as /flags) matches the collapsed form only, and therefore forwards the padded literal to the bRPC server, where it is dispatched as if it were the collapsed form. This differential allows //flags?setvalue= to reach a builtin service that /flags is not allowed to reach. Additionally, the HTTP/2 implementation never validated the :path pseudo-header, so requests without a :path, or with a :path that neither begins with '/' nor is the asterisk-form '*', contrary to RFC 9113 section 8.3.1, were not rejected. Affected Scenarios: Deployments of Apache bRPC behind a front proxy or gateway that performs access control (ACL) decisions on the literal request path, where the bRPC server accepts HTTP or HTTP/2 traffic from that proxy. In such deployments an attacker can send a path containing empty path segments to reach a resource that the front proxy intended to block. How to Fix: (Choose one of the following options) 1. Upgrade bRPC to version 1.18.0, which fixes this issue. 2. Apply this patch: https://github.com/apache/brpc/pull/3512 Note: After applying the fix, HTTP and HTTP/2 request paths containing empty path segments (consecutive slashes) are rejected by default, and HTTP/2 :path values that are empty or neither begin with '/' nor equal '*' are rejected. Deployments that depend on the previous lenient behavior can restore it by turning on the gflag -http_allow_empty_path_segments, which is not recommended for servers exposed to untrusted traffic.

Affected

Our own answer: ranges merged, affected separated from platform-only, with confidence and review flags.

All versions

Remediation

No guide yet

No remediation guidance has been written for this CVE yet. What the record does show:

References (1)

SSVC — Action Prioritization

SSVCNo known exploitAutomatablePartial impact

SSVC signals action urgency (what to patch first), separate from CVSS which measures severity.

CVSS

7.5HIGHCISA-ADP
Attack Vector
NETWORK
Complexity
LOW
Privileges
NONE
User Interaction
NONE
Scope
UNCHANGED
Confidentiality
NONE
Integrity
HIGH
Availability
NONE
Vector?

Quick Info

StatusDEFERRED
CWE
CWE-436

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