CVE-2026-80819

Bluetooth: RFCOMM: take rfcomm_mutex for the deferred setup accept

N/A
Published: September 4, 2026 at 03:13 PM UTC
Updated: October 19, 2026 at 09:17 AM UTC
1 product affected across 1 vendorLinux Kernel

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Severity
N/A
Exploit prediction
EPSS 0.2%

Description

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: Bluetooth: RFCOMM: take rfcomm_mutex for the deferred setup accept rfcomm_sock_recvmsg() completes a deferred setup by calling rfcomm_dlc_accept() without holding any RFCOMM lock: if (test_and_clear_bit(RFCOMM_DEFER_SETUP, &d->flags)) { rfcomm_dlc_accept(d); return 0; } and rfcomm_dlc_accept() dereferences the session on its first line: struct sock *sk = d->session->sock->sk; Every other path that touches d->session runs under rfcomm_mutex: rfcomm_dlc_open(), rfcomm_dlc_close(), rfcomm_dlc_exists(), rfcomm_dlc_send_rpn(), and the RFCOMM thread through rfcomm_process_sessions(). rfcomm_connect_ind() is even documented as "called under rfcomm_lock()". This call site is the only one that skips it. The RFCOMM_DEFER_SETUP bit looks like it serialises the accept against teardown, since __rfcomm_dlc_close() returns early when it wins the test_and_clear. But rfcomm_recv_disc() forces the state first: d->state = BT_CLOSED; __rfcomm_dlc_close(d, err); and the early return only covers BT_CONNECT, BT_CONFIG, BT_OPEN and BT_CONNECT2. With the state already BT_CLOSED that switch does not match, the bit is never consulted, and __rfcomm_dlc_close() falls through to rfcomm_dlc_unlink(), which sets d->session = NULL. So a remote DISC on a deferred dlc clears the session while leaving RFCOMM_DEFER_SETUP set. The next recvmsg() then passes the test_and_clear and dereferences a NULL session. No timing window is needed: once the DISC has been processed, the dereference is unconditional. Give rfcomm_dlc_accept() the same shape as rfcomm_dlc_open() and rfcomm_dlc_close(): an exported wrapper that takes rfcomm_mutex and re-checks the session, around a __rfcomm_dlc_accept() that the two in-core callers, which already hold the mutex, keep using. Reproduced on a KASAN + PROVE_LOCKING kernel with a BR/EDR peer emulated over /dev/vhci: the peer brings up an ACL link, opens L2CAP on the RFCOMM PSM, starts a session, opens a dlc on a channel bound with BT_DEFER_SETUP, and sends DISC after the socket is accepted. recv() on the accepted socket then hits: Oops: general protection fault KASAN: null-ptr-deref in range [0x0000000000000010-0x0000000000000017] RIP: 0010:rfcomm_dlc_accept+0x54/0x350 Call Trace: rfcomm_sock_recvmsg+0x1cd/0x230 sock_recvmsg+0x166/0x1c0 __sys_recvfrom+0x20d/0x300 0x10 is the offset of sock in struct rfcomm_session. With this patch the same run completes with recv() returning 0 and no report, and lockdep stays quiet, confirming rfcomm_mutex is still taken before lock_sock on this path as it is on the thread side.

Affected

Our own answer: ranges merged, affected separated from platform-only, with confidence and review flags.

2.6.30bb23c0ab824653be4aa7dfca15b07b3059717004
Vendor states this is fixed in 355bfd57ca4ca881c6eb03ca813b440a094b1f44 (fixed)
Vendor states this is fixed in 362726c9c6e56eea4262109183e49868c39ccd3a (fixed)
Vendor states this is fixed in 43a556b2fd43f2df6dded59c2e26560a27874c24 (fixed)
Vendor states this is fixed in 56f0aa75c7640e46397ef73bea251fcbef9150c0 (fixed)
Vendor states this is fixed in 825b95561d7b7c393df9e7bc295451aaeadc3d18 (fixed)
Vendor states this is fixed in b405c2f96ae2e37375105881890f7738833b1d62 (fixed)
Vendor states this is fixed in d4b1a13b1eff2e80925c7368ffdeaaa50cba93df (fixed)
Vendor states this is fixed in d8d686dd5662a7c4745e4515f1237a9f3b7df181 (fixed)
Vendor states this is fixed in eb71d5a1ea8ff2683e394b48ae3cd676037ab4c2 (fixed)
Vendor states this is fixed in 2.6.30 (unaffected)
Vendor states this is fixed in 5.10.267 (unaffected)
Vendor states this is fixed in 5.15.218 (unaffected)
Vendor states this is fixed in 6.1.185 (unaffected)
Vendor states this is fixed in 6.12.106 (unaffected)
Vendor states this is fixed in 6.18.47 (unaffected)
Vendor states this is fixed in 6.6.154 (unaffected)
Vendor states this is fixed in 7.1.11 (unaffected)
Vendor states this is fixed in 7.2.1 (unaffected)
Vendor states this is fixed in 7.3 (unaffected)
Vendor states this is fixed in 7.3-rc1 (unaffected)

Remediation

No guide yet

No remediation guidance has been written for this CVE yet, and no fixed version or vendor advisory is recorded against it.

Quick Info

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