CVE-2026-74503

ALSA: timer: Clear SNDRV_TIMER_IFLG_DEAD once the close completes

HIGH
7.8
CVSS Score
Published: August 15, 2026 at 12:27 PM UTC
Updated: October 16, 2026 at 08:17 PM UTC
1 product affected across 1 vendorLinux Kernel

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Severity
HIGH7.8
Exploit prediction
EPSS 0.2%
SSVC
No known exploit

Description

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ALSA: timer: Clear SNDRV_TIMER_IFLG_DEAD once the close completes snd_timer_close_locked() marks an instance with SNDRV_TIMER_IFLG_DEAD and returns early when the flag is already set, but the flag is never cleared again. A completed close ends in remove_slave_links(), which leaves timeri->timer NULL, so a second close is already harmless through the timer == NULL path; the early return can only be reached by an instance that was opened again in between. For such an instance the close unlinks nothing, so snd_timer_instance_free() frees an object that is still on timer->open_list_head, still on snd_timer_master_list if it was opened with a slave key, still owns any adopted slaves, and still holds its timer and module references. snd_seq_timer_open() reopens an instance exactly like that: it retries its fallback open on the same object after a failure that has already run snd_timer_close_locked() internally. An unprivileged user with access to /dev/snd/timer and /dev/snd/seq can force that failure, since snd_timer_check_master() returns -EBUSY when a pending slave matches the new master's (slave_class, slave_id) key and the target timer has reached max_instances, and SNDRV_TIMER_IOCTL_SELECT with dev_class = SNDRV_TIMER_CLASS_SLAVE keeps the caller-supplied dev_sclass, so a sequencer queue's key can be forged. The freed instance is afterwards dereferenced by any further snd_timer_open() on that timer, by snd_timer_check_slave(), and by /proc/asound/timers, which faults on the stale ti->owner pointer. The flag only has to be visible while the close is in progress, which is all its other users need. Clear it in remove_slave_links(), under the same timer->lock that sets it, once the instance is off every list.

Affected

Our own answer: ranges merged, affected separated from platform-only, with confidence and review flags.

586b219a22b1032b28b8bd356b963276c5e5bf536.12.946.18.3660e73ab87b84bbd6bd7ddd1d16019a3a3705ab8f7.0.137.1da3039e91d1f835874ed6e9a33ea19ee80c2cb92f46093dd22969037beb1fce2e043f3236be41c92
Vendor states this is fixed in 0c561fab50991df10b1e4daca25886c34a2a9c07 (fixed)
Vendor states this is fixed in a26a2e52736f9e39843ca66a2e1ce6bf1adbcd1e (fixed)
Vendor states this is fixed in bb016091010ec401a06e6bdace0cd944ee03d371 (fixed)
Vendor states this is fixed in c2744d5f3aea474513fd2298daecb94a952ce441 (fixed)
Vendor states this is fixed in 6.12.103 (unaffected)
Vendor states this is fixed in 6.18.44 (unaffected)
Vendor states this is fixed in 7.1 (unaffected)
Vendor states this is fixed in 7.1.8 (unaffected)
Vendor states this is fixed in 7.2 (unaffected)

Remediation

No guide yet

No remediation guidance has been written for this CVE yet, and no fixed version or vendor advisory is recorded against it.

SSVC — Action Prioritization

SSVCNo known exploitNot automatableTotal impact

SSVC signals action urgency (what to patch first), separate from CVSS which measures severity.

CVSS

7.8HIGHLinux
Vector?

Quick Info

StatusRECEIVED

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