CVE-2026-74407

wifi: ath11k: cancel SSR work items during PCI shutdown

HIGH
8.8
CVSS Score
Published: August 15, 2026 at 05:59 AM UTC
Updated: October 30, 2026 at 01:19 PM UTC
1 product affected across 1 vendorLinux Kernel

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Severity
HIGH8.8
Exploit prediction
EPSS 0.4%
SSVC
No known exploit

Description

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: wifi: ath11k: cancel SSR work items during PCI shutdown A reboot can crash the kernel if it overlaps with WLAN firmware crash recovery (SSR). The crash is a NULL pointer dereference in the MHI teardown path while freeing DMA-backed MHI contexts. Simplified trace: dma_free_attrs mhi_deinit_dev_ctxt [mhi] ath11k_pci_power_down [ath11k_pci] ath11k_pci_shutdown [ath11k_pci] device_shutdown kernel_restart On the host side, SSR is driven by the MHI RDDM callback, which queues reset_work to perform device recovery. reset_work power-cycles the device by calling ath11k_hif_power_down() followed by ath11k_hif_power_up(). The power-down phase deinitializes MHI and frees DMA resources. Shutdown/reboot runs fully asynchronously with this RDDM-driven SSR recovery flow. As a result, the shutdown path (ath11k_pci_shutdown() -> ath11k_pci_power_down()) can race with the SSR recovery sequence. Fix this by canceling SSR-related work items during PCI shutdown, marking the device as unregistering, and serializing the RDDM callback path that checks and queues reset_work. This ensures that no new SSR recovery work can be queued once teardown has started, and that any in-flight recovery work is fully synchronized before device power-down, preventing MHI teardown and DMA resource freeing from running more than once. Note: This issue only affects PCI/MHI-based devices. AHB-based ath11k devices do not queue reset_work in normal SSR flows. Tested-on: WCN6855 hw2.1 PCI WLAN.HSP.1.1-04866.5-QCAHSPSWPL_V1_V2_SILICONZ_IOE-1

Affected

Our own answer: ranges merged, affected separated from platform-only, with confidence and review flags.

13da397f884d9c9a3fb6616206eeb6c6ab0972875.19
Vendor states this is fixed in 53dd29e8aeb2a1b5f079178551836b85fc6b53df (fixed)
Vendor states this is fixed in 6dd3701facc0cee62d6682e49eed64499f9d0e43 (fixed)
Vendor states this is fixed in 8c79aac429b583301f387374ff37c59be671df87 (fixed)
Vendor states this is fixed in 5.19 (unaffected)
Vendor states this is fixed in 6.12.114 (unaffected)
Vendor states this is fixed in 6.18.53 (unaffected)
Vendor states this is fixed in 6.6.160 (unaffected)
Vendor states this is fixed in 7.1.5 (unaffected)
Vendor states this is fixed in 7.2 (unaffected)

Remediation

No guide yet

No remediation guidance has been written for this CVE yet, and no fixed version or vendor advisory is recorded against it.

SSVC — Action Prioritization

SSVCNo known exploitNot automatableTotal impact

SSVC signals action urgency (what to patch first), separate from CVSS which measures severity.

CVSS

8.8HIGHLinux
Vector?

Quick Info

StatusRECEIVED

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