CVE-2026-72340

net: microchip: vcap: fix races on the shared Super VCAP block

HIGH
7.8
CVSS Score
Published: August 15, 2026 at 05:55 AM UTC
Updated: August 17, 2026 at 06:18 AM UTC
1 product affected across 1 vendorLinux Kernel

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Severity
HIGH7.8
Exploit prediction
EPSS 0.2%

Description

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net: microchip: vcap: fix races on the shared Super VCAP block The VCAP instances on a chip are not independent, yet they are locked independently. On sparx5 and lan969x the IS0 and IS2 instances are backed by the same Super VCAP hardware block and share its cache and command registers: every access drives the shared VCAP_SUPER_CTRL register and moves data through the shared cache registers. Accessing one instance therefore races with accessing another. The per-instance admin->lock cannot prevent this, as each instance takes a different lock. The locking issue is mostly disguised by the fact that the core usage of the vcap api runs under rtnl. However, the full rule dump in debugfs decodes rules straight from hardware (a READ command followed by a cache read) and runs outside rtnl, so it races a concurrent tc-flower rule write to another Super VCAP instance. Besides corrupting the dump, the read repopulates the shared cache between the writers cache fill and its write command, so the writer commits the wrong data and corrupts the hardware entry. Introduce vcap_lock() and vcap_unlock() helpers and route every rule lock site in the VCAP API and its debugfs code through them. Replace the per-instance admin->lock with a single mutex in struct vcap_control that serializes access to all instances. The helpers reach it through a new admin->vctrl back-pointer, and the clients initialise and destroy the control lock instead of a per-instance one. No path holds more than one instance lock, so collapsing them onto a single mutex cannot self-deadlock.

Affected

Our own answer: ranges merged, affected separated from platform-only, with confidence and review flags.

6.2 ≤ v < 6.12.976.2 ≤ v < 6.18.406.2 ≤ v < 6.6.1456.2 ≤ v < 7.1.56.2 ≤ v < 7.26.271c9de995260222e739020104d477af4775a6d26
Vendor states this is fixed in 1e71a40d101547380590db582213c1f1dce1f041 (fixed)
Vendor states this is fixed in 49806bef9572a2e012610517bc14ed0a4db0d1fc (fixed)
Vendor states this is fixed in 786456d0a244bbd405dfc60e4de51f8b348b9cb1 (fixed)
Vendor states this is fixed in 952928564cc5fdb06f92d7e25c6cd2e1d816362b (fixed)
Vendor states this is fixed in d7a8d500d7e42837bd8dce40cb52c97c6e8706a9 (fixed)
Vendor states this is fixed in 6.12.97 (unaffected)
Vendor states this is fixed in 6.18.40 (unaffected)
Vendor states this is fixed in 6.2 (unaffected)
Vendor states this is fixed in 6.6.145 (unaffected)
Vendor states this is fixed in 7.1.5 (unaffected)
Vendor states this is fixed in 7.2 (unaffected)

Remediation

No guide yet

No remediation guidance has been written for this CVE yet, and no fixed version or vendor advisory is recorded against it.

CVSS

7.8HIGHLinux
Vector?

Quick Info

StatusRECEIVED

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