CVE-2026-72314

regulator: core: regulator_lock_two() should test for EDEADLK not EDEADLOCK

HIGH
7.8
CVSS Score
Published: August 15, 2026 at 05:55 AM UTC
Updated: October 16, 2026 at 07:17 PM UTC
1 product affected across 1 vendorLinux Kernel

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Severity
HIGH7.8
Exploit prediction
EPSS 0.2%
SSVC
No known exploit

Description

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: regulator: core: regulator_lock_two() should test for EDEADLK not EDEADLOCK Compare against -EDEADLK, which is what ww_mutex_lock() actually returns and what every other deadlock check in this file already uses. Function regulator_lock_two() acquires two regulators via regulator_lock_nested() -> ww_mutex_lock(). On contention, ww_mutex_lock() returns -EDEADLK, which is the caller's signal to drop the lock it holds and retry the acquisition in the canonical order. However, regulator_lock_two() tests the return value against -EDEADLOCK rather than -EDEADLK. On most architectures, EDEADLK and EDEADLOCK are the same value, so the comparison happens to be correct and the bug is invisible. But on MIPS, SPARC, and PowerPC, those two errors have different values. The test is wrong: a genuine -EDEADLK backoff no longer matches -EDEADLOCK, so instead of unlocking and retrying, the code falls into WARN_ON(ret) and returns with only one of the two regulators locked. In practice, this is a bug only on MIPS, because the regulator core is not built or used on the other two platforms. In general, EDEADLK is preferred over EDEADLOCK for new code.

Affected

Our own answer: ranges merged, affected separated from platform-only, with confidence and review flags.

06140d6dfe720d80566f792b4e28a9cd60a679701e3056b8067c2e9b7741c4e588f0acacbe4bdafc435c65af581a61ca249bd8f717c3a147dc119f115.10.1805.15.1115.4.2435224ea575196db11c0a909a78ea426ccdb92f0646.1.286.2.156.3.26.46140d6dfe720d80566f792b4e28a9cd60a67970849ab4cf182b38e562ffcc1b494d510e948822ddcba6cfdc7c3f1516f0d08ddfb24e689af0932573cdc042430ea9e07f77ce05a9d29e227dbdecc733
Vendor states this is fixed in 0c305eac40470a224671858a215963b070f9b2a9 (fixed)
Vendor states this is fixed in 153d1b8b5bc30847eb70ad535f62f289aa9217e6 (fixed)
Vendor states this is fixed in 29a7953e9adea6c7f9e64947745b79158e7cea7f (fixed)
Vendor states this is fixed in 346e2d666a29ae7233c56b356a0487eb1d42589b (fixed)
Vendor states this is fixed in 8e39aa63798ea0a797fd9341419f12ef91df3238 (fixed)
Vendor states this is fixed in d38f8bd771c4999b797d7074b348cf201414bd34 (fixed)
Vendor states this is fixed in dc804f390fddd9c389edf0976356942e16878d8f (fixed)
Vendor states this is fixed in e2063307ea3b6da74585129ba7b588e8243e2ef0 (fixed)
Vendor states this is fixed in 5.10.261 (unaffected)
Vendor states this is fixed in 5.15.212 (unaffected)
Affected range stops below 5.5, so it looks safe — our inference, not a vendor statement
Vendor states this is fixed in 6.1.178 (unaffected)
Vendor states this is fixed in 6.12.97 (unaffected)
Vendor states this is fixed in 6.18.40 (unaffected)
Affected range stops below 6.3, so it looks safe — our inference, not a vendor statement
Vendor states this is fixed in 6.4 (unaffected)
Vendor states this is fixed in 6.6.145 (unaffected)
Vendor states this is fixed in 7.1.5 (unaffected)
Vendor states this is fixed in 7.2 (unaffected)

Remediation

No guide yet

No remediation guidance has been written for this CVE yet, and no fixed version or vendor advisory is recorded against it.

SSVC — Action Prioritization

SSVCNo known exploitNot automatableTotal impact

SSVC signals action urgency (what to patch first), separate from CVSS which measures severity.

CVSS

7.8HIGHLinux
Vector?

Quick Info

StatusRECEIVED

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