libfs: set SB_I_NOEXEC and SB_I_NODEV by default in init_pseudo()
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In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: libfs: set SB_I_NOEXEC and SB_I_NODEV by default in init_pseudo() Since commit 1e7ab6f67824 ("anon_inode: rework assertions"), path_noexec() warns when an anonymous-inode file is mmap'd from a superblock that has not set SB_I_NOEXEC. dma-buf backs its files this way and never set the flag, so mmap of any exported buffer trips the warning on a CONFIG_DEBUG_VFS=y kernel: WARNING: CPU: 11 PID: 121813 at fs/exec.c:118 path_noexec+0x47/0x50 do_mmap+0x2b5/0x680 vm_mmap_pgoff+0x129/0x210 ksys_mmap_pgoff+0x177/0x240 __x64_sys_mmap+0x33/0x70 init_pseudo() sets up internal SB_NOUSER mounts that are never path-reachable. Set both flags here so every pseudo filesystem gets them by default instead of each caller setting them. SB_I_NODEV is inert for unreachable mounts. SB_I_NOEXEC has one visible effect: an executable mapping of a pseudo-fs fd, such as a dma-buf, now fails with -EPERM, which is the invariant the assertion enforces. No in-tree caller maps these executable. Reproduce on CONFIG_DEBUG_VFS=y: make -C tools/testing/selftests/dmabuf-heaps sudo ./tools/testing/selftests/dmabuf-heaps/dmabuf-heap -t system
Our own answer: ranges merged, affected separated from platform-only, with confidence and review flags.
No remediation guidance has been written for this CVE yet, and no fixed version or vendor advisory is recorded against it.
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