CVE-2026-64586

wifi: brcmfmac: drain bus_reset work on device removal

HIGH
8.8
CVSS Score
Published: August 6, 2026 at 07:06 AM UTC
Updated: October 19, 2026 at 09:17 PM UTC
1 product affected across 1 vendorLinux Kernel

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Severity
HIGH8.8
Exploit prediction
EPSS 0.3%
SSVC
No known exploit

Description

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: wifi: brcmfmac: drain bus_reset work on device removal brcmf_fw_crashed() and the debugfs "reset" entry both schedule drvr->bus_reset, whose callback recovers drvr through container_of() and dereferences it. The removal path frees drvr (brcmf_free -> wiphy_free) without draining the work, so a bus_reset callback pending or running during removal can outlive drvr. Cancellation cannot live in brcmf_detach() or brcmf_free(): the work callback reaches teardown through the bus .reset op (PCIe brcmf_pcie_reset -> brcmf_detach; SDIO brcmf_sdio_bus_reset -> brcmf_sdiod_remove -> brcmf_free), so cancelling there would wait for the running work and deadlock. Add a per-bus mutex (bus_reset_lock) and route all arming through brcmf_bus_schedule_reset(), which under the lock skips when the bus is marked removing. Each bus remove entry calls brcmf_bus_cancel_reset_work(), which under the same lock sets removing and cancels the work. Holding the mutex across cancel_work_sync() makes the set-removing + drain step atomic. Every producer reaches the arming path from process context -- the PCIe firmware-halt notification runs in the threaded IRQ handler (brcmf_pcie_isr_thread) and the SDIO hostmail path runs from the data workqueue -- so the mutex is taken only in sleepable contexts. Where applicable the remove entry first stops the firmware-crash producer: on PCIe mask the mailbox and synchronize_irq; on SDIO unregister the bus interrupt and cancel the data worker, which also reports firmware halts through brcmf_fw_crashed(). The mutex is initialized at bus allocation. The SDIO suspend power-off path frees drvr through the same brcmf_sdiod_remove() and takes the same lock; resume re-allows the work only on a successful re-probe. Also guard brcmf_fw_crashed() against a NULL bus_if/drvr: it can fire before brcmf_attach() wires up drvr, and it dereferences drvr (bphy_err/brcmf_dev_coredump) before reaching the arming gate. The bus_reset work is shared across buses, so the drain is applied to every remove path: PCIe (the .reset op introduced by the Fixes commit), SDIO (arms the same work through brcmf_fw_crashed()), and USB (via the debugfs "reset" entry). cancel_work_sync() drains a running or pending bus_reset work item before removal frees drvr, and patch 1/2 makes the scratch-buffer release safe when reset teardown has already released those DMA buffers. This patch fixes the lifetime of the bus_reset work item itself. It does not attempt to address the separate, pre-existing lifetime of the asynchronous firmware completion started by the PCIe reset path. That callback needs its own lifetime/ownership protocol and is being tracked separately. This issue was found by an in-house static analysis tool.

Affected

Our own answer: ranges merged, affected separated from platform-only, with confidence and review flags.

4684997d9eea29380000e062755aa6d368d789a35.2
Vendor states this is fixed in 02d378828af8bb74f6c2f4d2bee3c77cf16c861e (fixed)
Vendor states this is fixed in 177a25be1195f8bdc6160ba5f1a5699f7041c985 (fixed)
Vendor states this is fixed in 43b25879f004c98defa2776bedc6ca4763c51945 (fixed)
Vendor states this is fixed in 4824e3bcc68f8d678b409039d1bb48c7b5ea73dc (fixed)
Vendor states this is fixed in 61127dd20920bf28460a1609aabb0dafa2f54fac (fixed)
Vendor states this is fixed in 9dfb09cb0abbf92a06f93e0715e163aa188a84da (fixed)
Vendor states this is fixed in c268331845ee00dbdbccb000826bb612dff2bee7 (fixed)
Vendor states this is fixed in e3815d1ffbb9be4f1605ddc3b427557893461683 (fixed)
Vendor states this is fixed in 5.10.266 (unaffected)
Vendor states this is fixed in 5.15.217 (unaffected)
Vendor states this is fixed in 5.2 (unaffected)
Vendor states this is fixed in 6.1.184 (unaffected)
Vendor states this is fixed in 6.12.103 (unaffected)
Vendor states this is fixed in 6.18.44 (unaffected)
Vendor states this is fixed in 6.6.151 (unaffected)
Vendor states this is fixed in 7.1.6 (unaffected)
Vendor states this is fixed in 7.2 (unaffected)

Remediation

No guide yet

No remediation guidance has been written for this CVE yet, and no fixed version or vendor advisory is recorded against it.

SSVC — Action Prioritization

SSVCNo known exploitNot automatableTotal impact

SSVC signals action urgency (what to patch first), separate from CVSS which measures severity.

CVSS

8.8HIGHLinux
Vector?

Quick Info

StatusRECEIVED
CWE
CWE-416

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