Allure: Path Traversal in Allure Report HTTP Server Allows Arbitrary File Read
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Allure 2 is the version 2.x branch of Allure Report, a multi-language test reporting tool. Prior to 2.39.0, the HTTP server started by allure serve and allure open uses URI.getPath() in Commands.setUpServer() in allure-commandline/src/main/java/io/qameta/allure/Commands.java and passes the percent-decoded request path to reportDirectory.resolve() without normalizing the result or confirming that it remains inside that directory. An unauthenticated client that can reach the server can submit parent-directory segments, including percent-encoded segments, and cause serveFile() to return any regular file readable by the Allure process. The server binds to localhost by default, but the --host option can expose it to other systems, and local users, adjacent containers, or browser-origin attacks may reach a local listener. This can disclose credentials, configuration, source code, build secrets, and other CI/CD data. This issue is fixed in version 2.39.0.
Our own answer: ranges merged, affected separated from platform-only, with confidence and review flags.
No remediation guidance has been written for this CVE yet, and no fixed version or vendor advisory is recorded against it.
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