CVE-2026-50125

MKP: Unbounded Pod Log Read via Attacker-Controlled `limitBytes`/`tailLines` Causes Memory Exhaustion

HIGH

7.5

CVSS Score

Published: September 17, 2026 at 07:52 PM UTC

Updated: September 30, 2026 at 05:32 PM UTC

1 product affected across 1 vendorMKP

Using mkp by StacklokLabs?

Get instant alerts when new vulnerabilities affect mkp - before attackers find them.

Real-time alertsTrack your software stackFree plan available

Start Free Sign In

Severity

HIGH7.5

Exploit prediction

EPSS 0.5%

SSVC

PoC

Description

MKP is a Model Context Protocol server for Kubernetes. Prior to 0.4.1, cmd/server/main.go exposes the default HTTP endpoint and pkg/mcp/server.go registers the unauthenticated get_resource tool, which accepts attacker-controlled limitBytes and tailLines values for the pods logs subresource. buildPodLogOpts() in pkg/k8s/subresource.go parses those values as unbounded int64 parameters, and defaultGetPodLogs() copies the returned Kubernetes log stream through io.Copy into an in-memory bytes.Buffer without an application-side cap. A remote attacker who can reach the default port 8080 MCP endpoint and select a pod with sufficiently large accumulated logs can send one tools/call request that causes large allocations and additional response copies, while the request-frequency limiter does not constrain per-request volume. This can exhaust process memory, terminate the MKP server, and deny the MCP service; observed testing showed more than one GiB of RSS growth while handling a 128 MiB requested stream. This issue is fixed in version 0.4.1.