CVE-2026-46242

eventpoll: fix ep_remove struct eventpoll / struct file UAF

HIGH
7.8
CVSS Score
Published: May 30, 2026 at 12:13 PM UTC
Updated: October 19, 2026 at 08:18 PM UTC
1 product affected across 1 vendorLinux Kernel

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Severity
HIGH7.8
Exploit prediction
EPSS 4%
SSVC
No known exploit

Description

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: eventpoll: fix ep_remove struct eventpoll / struct file UAF ep_remove() (via ep_remove_file()) cleared file->f_ep under file->f_lock but then kept using @file inside the critical section (is_file_epoll(), hlist_del_rcu() through the head, spin_unlock). A concurrent __fput() taking the eventpoll_release() fastpath in that window observed the transient NULL, skipped eventpoll_release_file() and ran to f_op->release / file_free(). For the epoll-watches-epoll case, f_op->release is ep_eventpoll_release() -> ep_clear_and_put() -> ep_free(), which kfree()s the watched struct eventpoll. Its embedded ->refs hlist_head is exactly where epi->fllink.pprev points, so the subsequent hlist_del_rcu()'s "*pprev = next" scribbles into freed kmalloc-192 memory. In addition, struct file is SLAB_TYPESAFE_BY_RCU, so the slot backing @file could be recycled by alloc_empty_file() -- reinitializing f_lock and f_ep -- while ep_remove() is still nominally inside that lock. The upshot is an attacker-controllable kmem_cache_free() against the wrong slab cache. Pin @file via epi_fget() at the top of ep_remove() and gate the critical section on the pin succeeding. With the pin held @file cannot reach refcount zero, which holds __fput() off and transitively keeps the watched struct eventpoll alive across the hlist_del_rcu() and the f_lock use, closing both UAFs. If the pin fails @file has already reached refcount zero and its __fput() is in flight. Because we bailed before clearing f_ep, that path takes the eventpoll_release() slow path into eventpoll_release_file() and blocks on ep->mtx until the waiter side's ep_clear_and_put() drops it. The bailed epi's share of ep->refcount stays intact, so the trailing ep_refcount_dec_and_test() in ep_clear_and_put() cannot free the eventpoll out from under eventpoll_release_file(); the orphaned epi is then cleaned up there. A successful pin also proves we are not racing eventpoll_release_file() on this epi, so drop the now-redundant re-check of epi->dying under f_lock. The cheap lockless READ_ONCE(epi->dying) fast-path bailout stays.

Affected

Our own answer: ranges merged, affected separated from platform-only, with confidence and review flags.

5.15.209 ≤ v < 5.166.1.175 ≤ v < 6.26.19 ≤ v < 7.0.106.4 ≤ v < 6.18.335.15.20958c9b016e12855286370dfb704c08498edbc857a6.1.1756.4a1f93804449d13f97dabd4b996817de4bf1ed67af2451def095c1743adcfcb0cb5dadc86034e162a
Vendor states this is fixed in 2de4db145b2992da496fea6c51f9839be678ae24 (fixed)
Vendor states this is fixed in 3e1144d2515d28e4312e663ea05eac203101491d (fixed)
Vendor states this is fixed in 9324de74a3a59b9fde9b62ee45ebaa71458ba2e5 (fixed)
Vendor states this is fixed in a10fbbe74e1c743beb1bb312109366667461df8a (fixed)
Vendor states this is fixed in a6dc643c69311677c574a0f17a3f4d66a5f3744b (fixed)
Vendor states this is fixed in ced39b6a8062bac5c18a1c3df85634107eb8664a (fixed)
Vendor states this is fixed in ef4ca02e95363e78977ca04340d44fe3b4b2b81f (fixed)
Vendor states this is fixed in 5.15.222 (unaffected)
Affected range stops below 5.16, so it looks safe — our inference, not a vendor statement
Vendor states this is fixed in 6.1.178 (unaffected)
Vendor states this is fixed in 6.12.95 (unaffected)
Vendor states this is fixed in 6.18.33 (unaffected)
Affected range stops below 6.2, so it looks safe — our inference, not a vendor statement
Vendor states this is fixed in 6.4 (unaffected)
Vendor states this is fixed in 6.6.144 (unaffected)
Vendor states this is fixed in 7.0.10 (unaffected)
Vendor states this is fixed in 7.1 (unaffected)

SSVC — Action Prioritization

SSVCNo known exploitNot automatableTotal impact

SSVC signals action urgency (what to patch first), separate from CVSS which measures severity.

CVSS

7.8HIGHLinux
Vector?

Quick Info

StatusMODIFIED
CWE
CWE-416

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