Symfony: Email Header / SMTP Command Injection via CRLF in Symfony\Component\Mime\Address
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### Description `Symfony\Component\Mime\Address` is the value-object every Symfony Mailer address (to/cc/bcc/from/reply-to) flows through; its constructor is documented as validating the address and throwing on invalid input, so developers treat it as a security boundary. The constructor accepts email addresses whose local-part (the part before `@`) is an RFC-5322 *quoted string* containing raw `\r\n` bytes — e.g. `"x\r\nBcc: attacker@evil"@example.com`. The stored address is later emitted verbatim into (1) the rendered message headers and (2) `SmtpTransport`'s `MAIL FROM:<...>` / `RCPT TO:<...>` protocol lines, turning the embedded CRLF into a new mail header and/or a new SMTP command. ### Resolution The `Address` constructor now rejects addresses containing line breaks. The patch for this issue is available [here](https://github.com/symfony/symfony/commit/dc2dbd29211eb4ddc451373fa1374fb926e94604) for branch 5.4. ### Credits We would like to thank Claude Mythos Preview (via Project Glasswing) for reporting the issue and providing the fix.
Our own answer: ranges merged, affected separated from platform-only, with confidence and review flags.
No remediation guidance has been written for this CVE yet, and no fixed version or vendor advisory is recorded against it.
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