CVE-2026-43489

liveupdate: luo_file: remember retrieve() status

MEDIUM
5.5
CVSS Score
Published: May 13, 2026 at 03:08 PM UTC
Updated: June 27, 2026 at 11:41 AM UTC
1 product affected across 1 vendorLinux Kernel

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Severity
MEDIUM5.5
Exploit prediction
EPSS 0.1%

Description

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: liveupdate: luo_file: remember retrieve() status LUO keeps track of successful retrieve attempts on a LUO file. It does so to avoid multiple retrievals of the same file. Multiple retrievals cause problems because once the file is retrieved, the serialized data structures are likely freed and the file is likely in a very different state from what the code expects. The retrieve boolean in struct luo_file keeps track of this, and is passed to the finish callback so it knows what work was already done and what it has left to do. All this works well when retrieve succeeds. When it fails, luo_retrieve_file() returns the error immediately, without ever storing anywhere that a retrieve was attempted or what its error code was. This results in an errored LIVEUPDATE_SESSION_RETRIEVE_FD ioctl to userspace, but nothing prevents it from trying this again. The retry is problematic for much of the same reasons listed above. The file is likely in a very different state than what the retrieve logic normally expects, and it might even have freed some serialization data structures. Attempting to access them or free them again is going to break things. For example, if memfd managed to restore 8 of its 10 folios, but fails on the 9th, a subsequent retrieve attempt will try to call kho_restore_folio() on the first folio again, and that will fail with a warning since it is an invalid operation. Apart from the retry, finish() also breaks. Since on failure the retrieved bool in luo_file is never touched, the finish() call on session close will tell the file handler that retrieve was never attempted, and it will try to access or free the data structures that might not exist, much in the same way as the retry attempt. There is no sane way of attempting the retrieve again. Remember the error retrieve returned and directly return it on a retry. Also pass this status code to finish() so it can make the right decision on the work it needs to do. This is done by changing the bool to an integer. A value of 0 means retrieve was never attempted, a positive value means it succeeded, and a negative value means it failed and the error code is the value.

Affected

Our own answer: ranges merged, affected separated from platform-only, with confidence and review flags.

6.19 ≤ v < 6.19.96.19 ≤ v < 7.07.0 rc17c722a7f44e0c1f9714084152226bc7bd644b7e3
Vendor states this is fixed in 1d3ad69484dc1cc53be62d2554e7ef038a627af9 (fixed)
Vendor states this is fixed in f85b1c6af5bc3872f994df0a5688c1162de07a62 (fixed)
Vendor states this is fixed in 6.19 (unaffected)
Vendor states this is fixed in 6.19.9 (unaffected)
Vendor states this is fixed in 7.0 (unaffected)

Remediation

No guide yet

No remediation guidance has been written for this CVE yet. What the record does show:

CVSS

Attack Vector
LOCAL
Complexity
LOW
Privileges
LOW
User Interaction
NONE
Scope
UNCHANGED
Confidentiality
NONE
Integrity
NONE
Availability
HIGH
Vector?

Quick Info

StatusANALYZED
CWE
NVD-CWE-noinfo

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