CVE-2026-41417
Netty vulnerable to HTTP request smuggling and RTSP request injection via DefaultHttpRequest.setUri()
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Description
Netty allows request-line validation to be bypassed when a `DefaultHttpRequest` or `DefaultFullHttpRequest` is created first and its URI is later changed via `setUri()`. The constructors reject CRLF and whitespace characters that would break the start-line, but `setUri()` does not apply the same validation. `HttpRequestEncoder` and `RtspEncoder` then write the URI into the request line verbatim. If attacker-controlled input reaches `setUri()`, this enables CRLF injection and insertion of additional HTTP or RTSP requests, leading to HTTP request smuggling or desynchronization on the HTTP side and request injection on the RTSP side. This issue is fixed in versions 4.2.13.Final and 4.1.133.Final.
Remediation
No guide yetNo remediation guidance has been written for this CVE yet. What the record does show:
Patch and advisory references
References (1)
SSVC — Action Prioritization
SSVC signals action urgency (what to patch first), separate from CVSS which measures severity.
CVSS
- Attack Vector
- NETWORK
- Complexity
- LOW
- Privileges
- NONE
- User Interaction
- NONE
- Scope
- UNCHANGED
- Confidentiality
- NONE
- Integrity
- LOW
- Availability
- NONE
Quick Info
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