Angular SSR Vulnerable to Protocol-Relative URL Injection via Single Backslash Bypass
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The Angular SSR is a server-rise rendering tool for Angular applications. Versions on the 22.x branch prior to 22.0.0-next.2, the 21.x branch prior to 21.2.3, and the 20.x branch prior to 20.3.21 have an Open Redirect vulnerability in `@angular/ssr` due to an incomplete fix for CVE-2026-27738. While the original fix successfully blocked multiple leading slashes (e.g., `///`), the internal validation logic fails to account for a single backslash (`\`) bypass. When an Angular SSR application is deployed behind a proxy that passes the `X-Forwarded-Prefix` header, an attacker provides a value starting with a single backslash, the internal validation failed to flag the single backslash as invalid, the application prepends a leading forward slash, resulting in a `Location` header containing the URL, and modern browsers interpret the `/\` sequence as `//`, treating it as a protocol-relative URL and redirecting the user to the attacker-controlled domain. Furthermore, the response lacks the `Vary: X-Forwarded-Prefix` header, allowing the malicious redirect to be stored in intermediate caches (Web Cache Poisoning). Versions 22.0.0-next.2, 21.2.3, and 20.3.21 contain a patch. Until the patch is applied, developers should sanitize the `X-Forwarded-Prefix` header in their `server.ts` before the Angular engine processes the request.
Our own answer: ranges merged, affected separated from platform-only, with confidence and review flags.
No remediation guidance has been written for this CVE yet. What the record does show:
SSVC signals action urgency (what to patch first), separate from CVSS which measures severity.
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