CVE-2026-105299

Pingora forwards client-nominated Connection headers to HTTP/1 upstreams, allowing ACL bypass in specific chained deployments

HIGH
8.7
CVSS Score
Published: October 20, 2026 at 01:07 AM UTC
Updated: October 20, 2026 at 08:17 PM UTC
1 product affected across 1 vendorPingora

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Severity
HIGH8.7
Exploit prediction
EPSS 0.4%
SSVC
No known exploit

Description

Summary Before version 0.9.0, the HTTP/1 upstream path in pingora-proxy passed the downstream request through upstream_request_filter and wrote it to the upstream without removing the client's Connection header, other hop-by-hop headers, or the headers Connection nominated, although RFC 9110 Section 7.6.1 requires intermediaries to remove them. The HTTP/2 upstream path already removed Connection and related HTTP/1-specific headers. A client could therefore nominate a header that the application adds in upstream_request_filter (for example, Connection: keep-alive, X-Forwarded-For). A downstream HTTP/1 intermediary that honors Connection would then strip the Pingora-added header before it reached the origin. Impact Specifically affects chained deployments where an HTTP/1 intermediary between Pingora and the origin processes Connection nominations (for example, Go's net/http/httputil.ReverseProxy) and the origin trusts headers added by that intermediary (for example, X-Forwarded-For for IP-based authorization). A remote, unauthenticated attacker can have those headers removed, potentially bypassing authorization. The reporter demonstrated access to an IP-restricted endpoint using X-Forwarded-For for IP validation on the origin. This is the same class of issue as CVE-2022-31813 in Apache HTTP Server. Note that Cloudflare CDN customers were unaffected, as no such chained deployment as described above exists with internal Pingora services, and Connection headers are sanitized before arriving at Pingora gateways. Mitigation: * Upgrade to pingora 0.9.0 or later. By default, Pingora now removes hop-by-hop and Connection-nominated headers from upstream requests, and rejects requests whose Connection header nominates Host, X-Forwarded-For, X-Forwarded-Host, X-Forwarded-Proto, or a pseudo-header. This is controlled by PeerOptions::http_upstream_request_policy (HttpUpstreamRequestPolicy). Fix commits: https://github.com/cloudflare/pingora/commit/28c18e6b6b04dd0bd937234e5950049e6d74cded , https://github.com/cloudflare/pingora/commit/ca23f1668eca8e78be7ba62ef0edbd458b40eeee * Do not use HttpUpstreamRequestPolicy::preserve() if the origin relies on headers added by Pingora; it restores the old passthrough behavior. * If you cannot upgrade: in upstream_request_filter, remove the Connection header and every header it nominates before adding trusted headers.

Affected

Our own answer: ranges merged, affected separated from platform-only, with confidence and review flags.

Remediation

No guide yet

No remediation guidance has been written for this CVE yet, and no fixed version or vendor advisory is recorded against it.

References (1)

SSVC — Action Prioritization

SSVCNo known exploitNot automatableTotal impact

SSVC signals action urgency (what to patch first), separate from CVSS which measures severity.

CVSS

8.7HIGHcloudflare
Attack Vector
NETWORK
Complexity
HIGH
Privileges
NONE
User Interaction
NONE
Scope
CHANGED
Confidentiality
HIGH
Integrity
HIGH
Availability
NONE
Vector?

Quick Info

StatusAWAITING ANALYSIS
CWE
CWE-444

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