CVE-2025-39958

iommu/s390: Make attach succeed when the device was surprise removed

HIGH
7.8
CVSS Score
Published: October 9, 2025 at 09:47 AM UTC
Updated: October 21, 2026 at 01:18 PM UTC
1 product affected across 1 vendorLinux Kernel

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Severity
HIGH7.8
Exploit prediction
EPSS 0.2%

Description

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: iommu/s390: Make attach succeed when the device was surprise removed When a PCI device is removed with surprise hotplug, there may still be attempts to attach the device to the default domain as part of tear down via (__iommu_release_dma_ownership()), or because the removal happens during probe (__iommu_probe_device()). In both cases zpci_register_ioat() fails with a cc value indicating that the device handle is invalid. This is because the device is no longer part of the instance as far as the hypervisor is concerned. Currently this leads to an error return and s390_iommu_attach_device() fails. This triggers the WARN_ON() in __iommu_group_set_domain_nofail() because attaching to the default domain must never fail. With the device fenced by the hypervisor no DMAs to or from memory are possible and the IOMMU translations have no effect. Proceed as if the registration was successful and let the hotplug event handling clean up the device. This is similar to how devices in the error state are handled since commit 59bbf596791b ("iommu/s390: Make attach succeed even if the device is in error state") except that for removal the domain will not be registered later. This approach was also previously discussed at the link. Handle both cases, error state and removal, in a helper which checks if the error needs to be propagated or ignored. Avoid magic number condition codes by using the pre-existing, but never used, defines for PCI load/store condition codes and rename them to reflect that they apply to all PCI instructions.

Affected

Our own answer: ranges merged, affected separated from platform-only, with confidence and review flags.

6.2 ≤ v < 6.16.959bbf596791b89c7f88fdcac29dfc39c1221d25d6.176.17 rc16.17 rc26.17 rc36.17 rc46.17 rc56.17 rc66.2
Vendor states this is fixed in 359613f2fa009587154511e4842e8ab9532edd15 (fixed)
Vendor states this is fixed in 9ffaf5229055fcfbb3b3d6f1c7e58d63715c3f73 (fixed)
Vendor states this is fixed in 6.12.114 (unaffected)
Vendor states this is fixed in 6.16.9 (unaffected)
Vendor states this is fixed in 6.17 (unaffected)
Vendor states this is fixed in 6.2 (unaffected)
Vendor states this is fixed in 6.6.160 (unaffected)

Remediation

No guide yet

No remediation guidance has been written for this CVE yet. What the record does show:

CVSS

Attack Vector
LOCAL
Complexity
LOW
Privileges
LOW
User Interaction
NONE
Scope
UNCHANGED
Confidentiality
HIGH
Integrity
HIGH
Availability
HIGH
Vector?

Quick Info

StatusMODIFIED
CWE
NVD-CWE-noinfo

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