CVE-2024-26960

mm: swap: fix race between free_swap_and_cache() and swapoff()

HIGH
7
CVSS Score
Published: May 1, 2024 at 05:19 AM UTC
Updated: October 15, 2026 at 01:17 AM UTC
3 products affected across 3 vendorsLinux KernelDebian LinuxSIMATIC S7-1500 TM MFP

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Severity
HIGH7
Exploit prediction
EPSS 0.2%
SSVC
No known exploit

Description

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: mm: swap: fix race between free_swap_and_cache() and swapoff() There was previously a theoretical window where swapoff() could run and teardown a swap_info_struct while a call to free_swap_and_cache() was running in another thread. This could cause, amongst other bad possibilities, swap_page_trans_huge_swapped() (called by free_swap_and_cache()) to access the freed memory for swap_map. This is a theoretical problem and I haven't been able to provoke it from a test case. But there has been agreement based on code review that this is possible (see link below). Fix it by using get_swap_device()/put_swap_device(), which will stall swapoff(). There was an extra check in _swap_info_get() to confirm that the swap entry was not free. This isn't present in get_swap_device() because it doesn't make sense in general due to the race between getting the reference and swapoff. So I've added an equivalent check directly in free_swap_and_cache(). Details of how to provoke one possible issue (thanks to David Hildenbrand for deriving this): --8<----- __swap_entry_free() might be the last user and result in "count == SWAP_HAS_CACHE". swapoff->try_to_unuse() will stop as soon as soon as si->inuse_pages==0. So the question is: could someone reclaim the folio and turn si->inuse_pages==0, before we completed swap_page_trans_huge_swapped(). Imagine the following: 2 MiB folio in the swapcache. Only 2 subpages are still references by swap entries. Process 1 still references subpage 0 via swap entry. Process 2 still references subpage 1 via swap entry. Process 1 quits. Calls free_swap_and_cache(). -> count == SWAP_HAS_CACHE [then, preempted in the hypervisor etc.] Process 2 quits. Calls free_swap_and_cache(). -> count == SWAP_HAS_CACHE Process 2 goes ahead, passes swap_page_trans_huge_swapped(), and calls __try_to_reclaim_swap(). __try_to_reclaim_swap()->folio_free_swap()->delete_from_swap_cache()-> put_swap_folio()->free_swap_slot()->swapcache_free_entries()-> swap_entry_free()->swap_range_free()-> ... WRITE_ONCE(si->inuse_pages, si->inuse_pages - nr_entries); What stops swapoff to succeed after process 2 reclaimed the swap cache but before process1 finished its call to swap_page_trans_huge_swapped()? --8<-----

Affected

Our own answer: ranges merged, affected separated from platform-only, with confidence and review flags.

4.11 ≤ v < 5.10.2155.11 ≤ v < 5.15.1545.16 ≤ v < 6.1.846.2 ≤ v < 6.6.246.7 ≤ v < 6.7.126.8 ≤ v < 6.8.34.117c00bafee87c7c00bafee87c7bac7ed9eced7c161f8e5332cb4e
Vendor states this is fixed in 0f98f6d2fb5f (fixed)
Vendor states this is fixed in 0f98f6d2fb5fad00f8299b84b85b6bc1b6d7d19a (fixed)
Vendor states this is fixed in 1ede7f1d7eed (fixed)
Vendor states this is fixed in 1ede7f1d7eed1738d1b9333fd1e152ccb450b86a (fixed)
Vendor states this is fixed in 2da5568ee222 (fixed)
Vendor states this is fixed in 2da5568ee222ce0541bfe446a07998f92ed1643e (fixed)
Vendor states this is fixed in 363d17e7f790 (fixed)
Vendor states this is fixed in 363d17e7f7907c8e27a9e86968af0eaa2301787b (fixed)
Vendor states this is fixed in 3ce4c4c653e4 (fixed)
Vendor states this is fixed in 3ce4c4c653e4e478ecb15d3c88e690f12cbf6b39 (fixed)
Vendor states this is fixed in 82b1c07a0af6 (fixed)
Vendor states this is fixed in 82b1c07a0af603e3c47b906c8e991dc96f01688e (fixed)
Vendor states this is fixed in d85c11c97ecf (fixed)
Vendor states this is fixed in d85c11c97ecf92d47a4b29e3faca714dc1f18d0d (fixed)
Vendor states this is fixed in 4.11 (unaffected)
Vendor states this is fixed in 5.10.215 (unaffected)
Vendor states this is fixed in 5.15.154 (unaffected)
Vendor states this is fixed in 6.1.84 (unaffected)
Vendor states this is fixed in 6.6.24 (unaffected)
Vendor states this is fixed in 6.7.12 (unaffected)
Vendor states this is fixed in 6.8.3 (unaffected)
Vendor states this is fixed in 6.9 (unaffected)

References (9)

Patch
Source: 416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67
https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/0f98f6d2fb5fad00f8299b84b85b6bc1b6d7d19a
Patch
Source: 416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67
https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/1ede7f1d7eed1738d1b9333fd1e152ccb450b86a
Patch
Source: 416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67
https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/2da5568ee222ce0541bfe446a07998f92ed1643e
Patch
Source: 416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67
https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/363d17e7f7907c8e27a9e86968af0eaa2301787b
Patch
Source: 416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67
https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/3ce4c4c653e4e478ecb15d3c88e690f12cbf6b39
Patch
Source: 416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67
https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/82b1c07a0af603e3c47b906c8e991dc96f01688e
Patch
Source: 416baaa9-dc9f-4396-8d5f-8c081fb06d67
https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/d85c11c97ecf92d47a4b29e3faca714dc1f18d0d
Mailing ListThird Party Advisory
Source: af854a3a-2127-422b-91ae-364da2661108
https://lists.debian.org/debian-lts-announce/2024/06/msg00017.html

SSVC — Action Prioritization

SSVCNo known exploitNot automatablePartial impact

SSVC signals action urgency (what to patch first), separate from CVSS which measures severity.

CVSS

7HIGHLinux
Vector?

Quick Info

StatusMODIFIED
CWE
CWE-362

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