CVE-2023-41037

Cleartext Signed Message Signature Spoofing in openpgpjs

MEDIUM
4.3
CVSS Score
Published: August 29, 2023 at 04:46 PM UTC
Updated: June 17, 2026 at 06:20 AM UTC
1 product affected across 1 vendorOpenpgpjs

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Severity
MEDIUM4.3
Exploit prediction
EPSS 0.4%
SSVC
No known exploit

Description

OpenPGP.js is a JavaScript implementation of the OpenPGP protocol. In affected versions OpenPGP Cleartext Signed Messages are cryptographically signed messages where the signed text is readable without special tools. These messages typically contain a "Hash: ..." header declaring the hash algorithm used to compute the signature digest. OpenPGP.js up to v5.9.0 ignored any data preceding the "Hash: ..." texts when verifying the signature. As a result, malicious parties could add arbitrary text to a third-party Cleartext Signed Message, to lead the victim to believe that the arbitrary text was signed. A user or application is vulnerable to said attack vector if it verifies the CleartextMessage by only checking the returned `verified` property, discarding the associated `data` information, and instead _visually trusting_ the contents of the original message. Since `verificationResult.data` would always contain the actual signed data, users and apps that check this information are not vulnerable. Similarly, given a CleartextMessage object, retrieving the data using `getText()` or the `text` field returns only the contents that are considered when verifying the signature. Finally, re-armoring a CleartextMessage object (using `armor()` will also result in a "sanitised" version, with the extraneous text being removed. This issue has been addressed in version 5.10.1 (current stable version) which will reject messages when calling `openpgp.readCleartextMessage()` and in version 4.10.11 (legacy version) which will will reject messages when calling `openpgp.cleartext.readArmored()`. Users are advised to upgrade. Users unable to upgrade should check the contents of `verificationResult.data` to see what data was actually signed, rather than visually trusting the contents of the armored message.

Affected

Our own answer: ranges merged, affected separated from platform-only, with confidence and review flags.

v < 4.10.11v < 5.10.15.0.0 ≤ v < 5.10.0
Affected range stops below 4.10.11, so it looks safe — our inference, not a vendor statement
Affected range stops below 5.10.0, so it looks safe — our inference, not a vendor statement
Affected range stops below 5.10.1, so it looks safe — our inference, not a vendor statement

Remediation

No guide yet

No remediation guidance has been written for this CVE yet. What the record does show:

SSVC — Action Prioritization

SSVCNo known exploitNot automatablePartial impact

SSVC signals action urgency (what to patch first), separate from CVSS which measures severity.

CVSS

4.3MEDIUMGitHub_M
Attack Vector
NETWORK
Complexity
LOW
Privileges
NONE
User Interaction
REQUIRED
Scope
UNCHANGED
Confidentiality
NONE
Integrity
LOW
Availability
NONE
Vector?

Quick Info

StatusMODIFIED
CWE
CWE-347

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