CVE-2017-1000410

N/A
Published: December 7, 2017 at 07:00 PM UTC
Updated: June 17, 2026 at 12:59 AM UTC
9 products affected across 3 vendorsLinux KernelDebian LinuxEnterprise Linux Desktop

Using N/A by N/A?

Get instant alerts when new vulnerabilities affect N/A - before attackers find them.

Real-time alertsTrack your software stackFree plan available
Severity
N/A
Exploit prediction
EPSS 4%

Description

The Linux kernel version 3.3-rc1 and later is affected by a vulnerability lies in the processing of incoming L2CAP commands - ConfigRequest, and ConfigResponse messages. This info leak is a result of uninitialized stack variables that may be returned to an attacker in their uninitialized state. By manipulating the code flows that precede the handling of these configuration messages, an attacker can also gain some control over which data will be held in the uninitialized stack variables. This can allow him to bypass KASLR, and stack canaries protection - as both pointers and stack canaries may be leaked in this manner. Combining this vulnerability (for example) with the previously disclosed RCE vulnerability in L2CAP configuration parsing (CVE-2017-1000251) may allow an attacker to exploit the RCE against kernels which were built with the above mitigations. These are the specifics of this vulnerability: In the function l2cap_parse_conf_rsp and in the function l2cap_parse_conf_req the following variable is declared without initialization: struct l2cap_conf_efs efs; In addition, when parsing input configuration parameters in both of these functions, the switch case for handling EFS elements may skip the memcpy call that will write to the efs variable: ... case L2CAP_CONF_EFS: if (olen == sizeof(efs)) memcpy(&efs, (void *)val, olen); ... The olen in the above if is attacker controlled, and regardless of that if, in both of these functions the efs variable would eventually be added to the outgoing configuration request that is being built: l2cap_add_conf_opt(&ptr, L2CAP_CONF_EFS, sizeof(efs), (unsigned long) &efs); So by sending a configuration request, or response, that contains an L2CAP_CONF_EFS element, but with an element length that is not sizeof(efs) - the memcpy to the uninitialized efs variable can be avoided, and the uninitialized variable would be returned to the attacker (16 bytes).

Affected

Our own answer: ranges merged, affected separated from platform-only, with confidence and review flags.

References (13)

Mailing Listx_refsource_MLISTIssue TrackingPatchThird Party Advisory
http://seclists.org/oss-sec/2017/q4/357
VDB Entryx_refsource_BIDIssue TrackingThird Party Advisory
http://www.securityfocus.com/bid/102101
Vendor Advisoryx_refsource_REDHATThird Party Advisory
https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2018:0654
Vendor Advisoryx_refsource_REDHATThird Party Advisory
https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2018:0676
Vendor Advisoryx_refsource_REDHATThird Party Advisory
https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2018:1062
Vendor Advisoryx_refsource_REDHATThird Party Advisory
https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2018:1130
Vendor Advisoryx_refsource_REDHATThird Party Advisory
https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2018:1170
Vendor Advisoryx_refsource_REDHATThird Party Advisory
https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2018:1319

CVSS

Confidentiality
PARTIAL
Integrity
NONE
Availability
NONE
Vector?

Quick Info

StatusMODIFIED
CWE
CWE-200

Get alerted

Stop reading CVE feeds looking for your own stack

Track the products you run and VulnTracker tells you when a new CVE affects them — with what is known about fixing it, and nothing about the rest.

Free plan, no card